

VZCZCXRO9193
PP RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKK #1711/01 3301402
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251402Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2404
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0084
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0033
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0090
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0049
RHMFISS/CJTFF HOA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001711

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [UN](#) [AU](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: GOS LEADERS TO CONSIDER US-LED DARFUR CEASE-FIRE
MONITORING TEAM PROPOSAL

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1698

[1](#)B. KHARTOUM 1697

[1](#)C. KHARTOUM 1691

[1](#)D. STATE 122270

[1](#)E. KHARTOUM 1651

[1](#)F. KHARTOUM 1573

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d)

[1](#)1. (C) On November 25, CDA Fernandez met with key Government of Sudan (GoS) regime strategist and de-facto regime shadow Foreign Minister, Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail, in order to inform him the idea of a US-led independent Darfur Cease-Fire Monitoring Team (ref d). CDA Fernandez told Ismail that he had met with GoS Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Under Secretary Muttriff Siddiq and National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Chief Salah Ghosh on 23 November to pitch the US offer of support, and that he wanted Ismail also to be directly informed by the USG of the proposal (refs b and c). "You (the GoS) announced a cease-fire and UNAMID can't yet support a cease-fire monitoring mechanism," CDA told Ismail. "The US is willing to be helpful, to create and fund a US-led Darfur Cease-Fire Monitoring Team as a bridging mechanism until UNAMID is ready." CDA emphasized to Ismail the importance of getting a mechanism in place quickly so that the cease-fire announcement doesn't become another black mark on the GoS' very long list of undelivered promises. He noted that such a mechanism had worked very well in South Sudan and the Nuba Mountains in the run up to the 2005 CPA.

[1](#)2. (C) Ismail expressed frustration that the USG did not offer a monitoring mechanism plan before the GoS announcement of a Darfur cease-fire. He stated that it was because of pressure by the USG and the AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur Djibril Bassole that GoS President Al-Bashir actually announced a cease-fire at the closing ceremony of the Sudan Peoples' Initiative (SPI) on 12 November. "I thought we were ill-prepared to declare it (the cease-fire) at that time," said Ismail. CDA Fernandez assured Ismail that the GoS declaration of a cease-fire was the right thing, but suggested it could have been announced differently so as to not set immediate expectations for its follow-through without a monitoring mechanism in place. "We are trying to help you by providing you with an idea for a mechanism," said CDA. Ismail said that the GoS would look at the proposal. "I am going to see the Vice President (Taha) in half an hour. Maybe we'll discuss the paper. I will be positive about it," said Ismail.

[1](#)3. (C) Ismail also expressed concern about the timeline slippage for the US-facilitated air bridge of twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) from El Obeid to Nyala and Geneina and movement of Rwandan troops and material to Darfur (ref f). Ismail noted that the USG is quick to blame Sudan for the slightest transgression but won't openly say the obvious, "that UNAMID deployment is delayed because of the UN, not Sudan." He said Sudan would like to see even faster deployment of the hybrid force, "April 2009 is still a long way off to reach 80 per cent." CDA explained that the delay was a result of the UN's sluggishness in signing the airlift agreements. "This is a process, and the way to move forward is to agree to a US-led cease-fire monitoring team or you could choose to openly embrace it," CDA concluded.

[1](#)4. (C) Comment: The GoS will likely take its time mulling over the US-led Darfur Cease-Fire Monitoring Team proposal and, as always, carefully weigh the pros and cons of adopting such an initiative before making a move. We can definitely expect that the GoS will agree to at least some part of the proposal, yet downplay US involvement to avoid looking like

KHARTOUM 00001711 002 OF 002

it is caving in to US demands. With the clock ticking and international patience waning since the announcement of the cease-fire on November 12, the GoS will have to accept some sort of monitoring mechanism to show that it is serious about making peace in Darfur, and the US proposal is the only one on the table so far. Acceptance will also put pressure on the fractured rebel movements and on a still passive UNAMID. Certainly, the regime is eager to see additional light on the movement's predatory actions of the past months. End Comment.
FERNANDEZ